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Abstract 
This paper explores an important aspect of post-career earnings in public life 
in Britain: membership of corporate boards by former parliamentarians, ministers and 
civil servants. It attempts to determine whether this group represents a distinct group 
within the wider network of interlocking corporate directorships in the UK. Further, it 
specifically investigates the characteristics of those individuals who obtain 
appointments as non-executive directors to the boards of FTSE-listed companies after 
service in parliament and/or government and their relative connectedness and 
remuneration compared to the wider network of interlocking directors. The analysis 
uses data on board membership and pay in Britain for more than 700 companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange and over 7500 directors and 1000 former 
parliamentarians, government ministers and civil servants. The findings suggest that 
although this group are represented in the wider corporate network, they are not more 
central than other directors and do not receive significantly different compensations 
once industry sector, experience and board role are controlled for. While social class 
and educational backgrounds have been shown to be important in the sociological 
analysis of corporate networks, the influence of service in Parliament or British 
government has not yet been considered. By seeking to fill that gap, this paper offers 
novel insight into the interconnectedness of the public sphere and the corporate world.  
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Private wealth extracted by individuals after service in politics or government 
raises important questions close to the heart of democratic politics and public life. 
Salary levels, allowances and other perks of elected or unelected office are a recurring 
topic of interest in a wide range of social and political settings (e.g. Hood and Peters 
1994; 2003; Hood et al. 2001; Eggers and Hainmueller 2009). One of the central 
concerns of such studies is the nature of the post-career earnings of individuals after 
leaving public life – whether as elected officials or as unelected civil servants. This 
paper considers such post-career earnings in Britain through the appointment of 
former parliamentarians, government ministers and senior civil servants to corporate 
directorships in the City of London. Specifically, it seeks to shed light on the 
recruitment of former politicians and bureaucrats to corporate boards and the nature 
of financial returns to office. Whereas it is possible to measure the effect of political 
office on individual wealth (Eggers and Hainmueller 2009), this analyses the role 
performed by individuals who migrate from public life to serve as directors on the 
boards of top British companies and the nature of financial remuneration received for 
this work. In this, financial returns to office are secured in the form of salaries and 
share options awarded in lieu of corporate directorships.  
This question of financial returns to office is not just a British phenomenon. 
Similar concerns arise in comparative context (see Winters and Page 2009). There are 
conventions, for example, of post-retirement financial returns through the recruitment 
of former civil servants to private firms or public corporations in Japan (see Johnson 
1974; Blumenthal 1985; Colignon and Usui 2003; Nakamura and Dairokuno 2003) 
and South Korea (Kim 2003), while the ‘revolving-door’ between government and 
industry has been a longstanding focus of research in the US, in particular with regard 
to regulation (e.g. Freitag 1975; Gormley 1979; Cohen 1986). In a wider sense, too, 
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the recruitment of former politicians and civil servants to the boards of leading firms 
has the potential to provide insight into the relationship between politics, government 
and business.  
The theoretical approach behind our interest in patterns of the recruitment of 
former parliamentarians, government ministers and civil servants to the boardrooms 
of British companies, and the nature of post-career financial returns to office, rests 
upon specific expectations about the behaviour of individuals (including both elected 
and unelected officials) and firms. For individuals, appointments to corporate boards 
provides a means for securing financial remuneration through directors’ salaries and 
for also obtaining non-financial benefits such as prestige or networking opportunities 
(for example maintaining professional status or regular involvement in public life). It 
is important to emphasise that not all individuals who serve in parliament or British 
government wish, or possess the requisite skills, to serve on the boards of companies. 
The personal wealth of individuals is also subject to variation, leading to different 
motivations for post-career earnings. However, corporate directorships are one of a 
number of the potential sources of income for individuals after leaving parliament 
and/or British government (as elected or unelected officials). For firms, the 
recruitment of former parliamentarians, government ministers or civil servants offers 
a number of sources of economic value, such as knowledge of the policy process and 
procurement (e.g. Faccio 2006; Goldman et al. 2008; Jayachandran 2006; Roberts 
1990), political connections and prestige accrued during time in public office. These 
differ from the expertise available from other corporate directors with technical 
expertise in industry or financial accounting.  
To come to a better understanding both of the extent to which British 
companies appoint former politicians and civil servants to their boards and the nature 
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of financial returns to office, this paper seeks to determine whether certain career 
attributes – such as departmental background, seniority and political affiliation – are 
associated with greater connectedness and higher levels of financial remuneration for 
former ministers, parliamentarians and civil servants who later enter the corporate 
world. In so doing, it generates insights into the connection between politics, 
government and business. To achieve this, network analysis methods are applied to a 
dataset of corporate directors that covers up to 98% of the capital value of companies 
traded on the London Stock Exchange.  
The paper proceeds in three steps. Firstly it outlines a theoretical approach to 
account for the recruitment of former parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants to 
corporate boards and expectations concerning the nature of financial returns to office. 
Specifically, it introduces the concept of interlocking directorates for measuring the 
migration of former politicians and bureaucrats to the corporate world. Secondly, it 
describes the dataset on which the analysis is based; the database contains information 
on more than 1000 individuals who served in the British government or Parliament at 
some time between 1970 and 2008 and more than 7500 directors and 700 companies. 
Third, it presents results on post-career earnings through membership of corporate 
boards that reveal (a) differences of the positions and rewards of former politicians 
and civil servants compared with other directors, (b) the degree to which individuals 
who once inhabited British politics or government are represented within the network 
of corporate directors, and (c) the connectedness and compensation of the former 
parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants who sit on corporate boards.
1
 It also 
                                                 
1
 While this research design enables us descriptive insights into the network position and remuneration 
of corporate directors with a background in politics or government, to fully understand the nature of 
financial returns to public office it would be necessary to compare the social, economic and 
professional attributes of those individuals with their peers who did not subsequently enter corporate 
life and instead pursued other lifetime rewards (such as in the quasi-experimental design of Eggers and 
Hainmueller’s (2009) study into financial returns to political office). 
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considers the association of specific individual attributes – e.g. departmental 
background, political affiliation and rank/seniority – with network connectedness and 
the level of financial remuneration. The implications of the findings are then reflected 
upon in conclusion. 
 
1.  Corporate Networks and Post-Career Earnings in Public Life 
In Britain, an important feature of the traditional ‘public service bargain’ that 
applied to both politicians in Westminster and senior bureaucrats in Whitehall in the 
era of club government was the possibility for earnings outside public life (Hood and 
Lodge 2006, Chapter 4). For senior civil servants, such opportunities arose after their 
retirement from public service, while for politicians these were sometimes possible in 
combination with opposition or backbench activities as well as after their retirement 
from elected office. This arrangement reflected the close ties that existed between the 
worlds of high finance and politics (e.g. Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Marquand 1981; 
Moran 1981; 2003), and in particular involved the translation of political capital to the 
corporate boardroom.  
The close inter-relationship between politics, government and business comes 
into particular focus when considered as part of wider enquiry into the influence of 
social class and educational backgrounds in corporate networks (e.g. Scott and Griff 
1984; Scott 1991, Mizruchi 1996; Davis and Greve 1997; Burris 2005). Connections 
across and within these corporate networks derive from common membership to 
corporations and unfold on two interrelated, although not symmetrical, levels. Ties 
are created between directors when they belong to the same company and ties are 
created between firms when they share the same directors. The intersections between 
organisations and individuals are referred to as interlocks. These ties create potential 
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for the exchange of information and the diffusion of norms and practices across both 
firms and sectors (Breiger 1974; Levine 1972). Research finds that ties between 
directors are not just a product of interactions in the corporate world but are also 
rooted in shared kinship, education in elite schools and universities, and membership 
of select clubs (Whitley 1973; Fidler 1981; Scott and Griff 1984; Scott 1991; Kono et 
al. 1998; Bond 2005; 2007). It might also be expected that ties between directors in 
the corporate world would also reflect connections in politics and government.  
There has been extensive research into such networks of interlocking directors 
and their interface with politics (e.g. Useem 1984; Stokman et al. 1988; Scott 1991; 
Bond 2005; 2007; Burris 2005). Some directors (especially those at high-status firms) 
transfer resources of prestige and knowledge to the boards of other companies (Mace 
1971). It might be expected that the appointment of prominent figures from public life 
would perform a similar role in bringing their reputation, connections and technical 
expertise to the boardroom, as well as knowledge of the inner workings of politics and 
government. There is evidence that firms with connections to government or politics 
achieve higher stock valuations (for a review, see Eggers and Hainmueller 2009, p. 1). 
Further, financial gains accrue to businesses from having directors with a background 
in political office on their board (e.g. Faccio 2006; Goldman et al. 2008; 
Jayachandran 2006; Roberts 1990). Such individuals can provide companies with 
direct connections to the political world as well as offering them important experience 
of the drawing-up of legislation, government contracts and the regulation of industry. 
For companies, the value of recruitment of these individuals to their board might be 
derived from general attributes (for example due to their reputation, prestige, 
governance or networking) or traits that are domain-specific (such as technical 
expertise, ties to domestic industry or business overseas), or for some combination of 
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these reasons. In addition, service in elected or unelected public office provides for 
unique connections and knowledge of the political environment and government 
decision-making processes. It might, then, be expected that individuals with a 
background in parliament or government would be better connected than directors 
with other industry or business trajectories. Further, given this background, former 
politicians and bureaucrats might be more likely to be appointed to generalist 
positions that relate to corporate governance, such as non-executive directorships and 
chairmanships, rather than to expert industry or executive roles. These individuals 
will not tend to have expertise in corporate management or in professional disciplines 
such as accounting, audit or risk management. This in turn informs the expectation 
that these connections are not necessarily translated into proportionate rewards in the 
boardroom, since non-executive positions tend to be paid less in comparison to 
executive roles. The recruitment of individuals from politics and government to the 
boardroom is therefore expected to conform to a particular pattern. 
Our general theoretical model of corporate networks and post-career earnings 
can be summarised as follows: 
a) One of the opportunities for post-career earnings for former parliamentarians, 
government ministers and civil servants is recruitment to corporate boards.   
b) Corporate firms have reasons to recruit such individuals to their boards due to 
their unique attributes or resources acquired from service in politics and/or 
government (including prestige, reputation, knowledge of government and 
business, connections and technical expertise).  
c) In view of their non-commercial background, there is a greater likelihood of 
former parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants being recruited to the 
boards of companies in non-executive positions. This group is expected to 
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exhibit a higher degree of connectedness compared with other directors, but 
receive a lower level of financial remuneration. 
d) The post-career earning potential of individuals is a function of departmental 
status (i.e. there is a greater likelihood of firms appointing individuals from 
high prestige departments) and the strength of industry-departmental ties (i.e. 
firms will tend to appoint individuals drawn from departments engaged in high 
levels of procurement activity.   
 
Hypotheses 
H.1 
The first hypothesis concerns the general pattern of recruitment of individuals 
with a background in politics and government onto the boards of British companies 
and suggests this group is distinguishable, with respect to their network position and 
remuneration, from other directors. This is despite career-differences between elected-
partisan politicians and unelected-non-partisan career-bureaucrats in the British 
political system, where civil servants are expected to refrain from participation in the 
partisan realm – even after retirement. Nevertheless, common patterns can still be 
expected in the post-career opportunities open to former politicians and bureaucrats 
(H1). Apart from their shared social, educational and geographical backgrounds (e.g. 
Scott 1991), these groups share similar expertise of, and formal or informal ties to, the 
policy process and the regulatory environment – especially at the very top. Secretaries 
of State and permanent secretaries, for example, have access to the same paperwork 
and people, while both positions bestow a high level of prestige for individuals (as a 
function of the status of the government department). The reasons that companies 
recruit these individuals to their boards are therefore similar, deriving from the shared 
10 
 
attributes of these groups such as prestige and networking as well as their common 
knowledge of the policy domains, procurement and the legislative process. As such, it 
is possible to hypothesise that there is a relatively homogenous group of former 
parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants in the corporate world, with network 
positions and remuneration packages that are distinguishable from other directors in 
the boardroom.  
H1: There are similarities in the network positions and remuneration packages for 
former parliamentarians, government ministers and civil servants recruited to the 
boards of corporate firms and these are distinguishable from other directors in the 
corporate network. 
 
H.2 
The second hypothesis suggests that individuals who once served in politics or 
government will tend to be better connected in the network of interlocking directors, 
due to their pre-existing reputation and connections as well as due to their recruitment 
to non-executive positions (which can be held for multiple firms). This hypothesis is 
based on the claim that one of the main contributions that former parliamentarians, 
ministers and civil servants bring to the corporate table is their political connections 
and status, and it is therefore expected that this group will tend to hold interlocking 
directorships more than other directors, making them more connected.  
H2: Former parliamentarians, government ministers and civil servants tend to hold 
more central positions in the network of corporate directors.  
 
H.3 
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Further to this expectation regarding the more central network position of 
those individuals with a background in politics or government, the third hypothesis 
contends that the level of financial remuneration received for holding directorships 
will, in fact, tend to be lower for former parliamentarians, government ministers and 
civil servants. While it is conceivable that higher centrality might also translate into 
higher financial income, there are reasons to expect that remuneration of individuals 
with a background in politics or government might be lower, than their corporate 
peers (H3). The same political-governmental expertise and connections that are a 
unique resource in the recruitment of individuals as directors might also be expected 
to secure lower financial compensation than business skills with direct relevance to 
the practice of corporate governance (such as commercial expertise or qualifications 
in accounting, audit or risk management). Moreover, the remuneration of former 
politicians and civil servants is subject to Tocquevillian pressures (Hood and Peters 
1994: 10-11): according to this argument, as political systems become more 
democratic, financial returns to public office become more parsimonious in response 
both to institutional accountability and growing public interest (and criticism). It is 
hypothesised, then, that the remuneration package of corporate directors with a 
background in politics or government will tend to be less than other directors. 
H3: Corporate directors who are former parliamentarians, government ministers or 
civil servants receive remuneration levels that are significantly lower than other 
directors.  
 
H.4 
 Finally, the recruitment of former parliamentarians, government ministers and 
civil servants to corporate boards is expected to reflect relative status and expertise in 
public office, as well as political-governmental connection to particular sectors or 
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industries. Former officials with a career background in certain elite departments are 
expected to be well represented on the boards of corporations in specific sectors. This 
might be due to departmental status (as has been found in Japan) or to the strength of 
ties between departments and industry sectors (e.g., the military-industrial complex), 
such as those that involve substantial public spending or procurement. The reputation 
of former politicians and top civil servants is potentially attractive to firms in their 
recruitment of directors that provide a high status signal to investors. In addition, the 
seniority and status of individuals might also signalled through their ‘honours rank’, 
given the British tradition of rewarding public office with the non-financial award of 
knighthoods and such like. This is a further indicator of the reputation of individuals 
within the realms of politics and government, and the sorts of expertise, knowledge 
and connections that they possess, and their attractiveness as directors to firms in their 
recruitment decisions. This fourth hypothesis therefore suggests that differences in the 
network position and remuneration of former parliamentarians, government ministers 
and civil servants will reflect differences both in their rank and seniority in politics or 
government and their departmental affiliation.  
H4: The network position and remuneration of former parliamentarians, government 
ministers and civil servants are a function of their rank in politics/government and 
their departmental affiliation in public office. 
  
The main claim tested in this paper is, therefore, that corporate directors that at one 
time held office in government, parliament or the civil service have – as a group - a 
differential representation in the overall corporate network in terms of both centrality 
and compensation, and that this also reflects specific characteristics of their career in 
public office. Specifically, it seeks to establish the characteristics of former politicians 
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and civil servants who are recruited to the boards of firms and determine the extent to 
which this group is distinct from other corporate directors in terms of their network 
positions and remunerations. 
 
2. Data  
The data on which these analyses are based consists of information about the 
boards of directors and executive officers of companies listed on the UK’s FTSE All-
Share Index as of March 2009, tracking the composition of those boards for the period 
1999 to 2008. The data was obtained from the business networking service BoardEx 
(see www.boardex.com) in the form of annual reports listing the companies included 
in the index and the names of directors sitting on their boards. The reports also 
included additional information such as the age, gender, education, board role and 
annual compensation of directors. This dataset covers more than 700 companies, 
which constitute about 98 per cent of market capitalization, and contains information 
on 7936 individual directors.  
This information was combined with additional data about the career paths of 
former government ministers, civil servants and parliamentarians. An initial search of 
the Civil Service Yearbook identified around 1000 government ministers (cabinet 
ministers, ministers of state and law officers, 1970-2008) and civil servants (top three 
ranks, 1990-2008) as having served in high public office. This data was supplemented 
through additional searches of the BoardEx data for any parliamentarians, junior 
ministers or civil servants not identified in the initial round. Further information about 
political (e.g. role, rank, department, political affiliation, honours) and social (e.g. 
age, gender, education) attributes of former politicians and senior civil servants was 
compiled through the data portal KnowUK (www.knowuk.com), which aggregates 
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biographical information from sources such as Who’s Who and Debrett’s People of 
Today, and through additional online searches.  
The data for the entire period was aggregated in the form of a two-mode 
network, and the affiliation network of directors was projected as illustrated in Figure 
1. A connection between two directors indicates that they have sat in, at least, one 
common company board during the period between 1999 and 2008. This procedure is 
conventional in analyses of interlocking directorates (Breiger 1974), and is based on 
the assumption that sitting on the same board opens opportunities for interaction and 
long-term relationships through which valuable information can flow (Levine 1972). 
The position of directors in the network is relevant because it reflects their status in 
the overall structure of the corporate elite and can give them a differential access to 
unique vantage points from where to access and assess information. This is 
particularly true for interlocks, represented in Figure 1 by director 3 (D3): by sitting in 
two boards, this director connects different spheres of information. 
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3. Network Position and Attributes of Former Politicians and Civil Servants 
We start with a descriptive analysis of the network position of those with 
background in high political office in Britain. The network reconstructed using the 
procedure presented in the previous section is formed by a total of 7936 directors, and 
close to 84000 edges or connections (277 of these connections involve directors 
sharing more than one board). On the aggregate level, the network is divided into 56 
components, which are illustrated in Figure 2. The largest component, to the left of 
the figure, is formed by 94% (7483) of the directors in the dataset; the second largest 
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component is formed by 20 directors, and the rest vary between sizes of 19 and 3. 
What this means is that over the period considered here the network formed by 
interlocking directorates connects most of the corporate elite in a single structure, 
which makes every director potentially reachable for almost anybody else in the 
network. Assuming that this web of connections is the only means by which two 
directors could be introduced to each other this would, on average, take about 4 
shakes of hand -- a relatively short chain of intermediaries considering that there are 
close to 7500 directors in the network. This feature (which reveals the so-called 
‘small-world’ nature of the network) is not specific to the corporate world, however, 
and is also characteristic of a number of other social and natural networks (e.g. Easley 
and Kleinberg 2010; Newman 2010; Watts 2003). 
 
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The Overall Network of Directors 
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics about the composition of the 
network. Most directors are affiliated to just one company: only 19% of them sit on 
the boards of 2 or more organisations which means that only a small fraction of the 
corporate elite act as interlocks – the connectivity of the largest component identified 
above essentially relies on their role as intermediaries. As one would expect, directors 
with multiple positions receive significantly higher compensations (which is the total 
remuneration package, including salary, bonus, pension and shares, received by each 
director between 1999 and 2008), and are slightly older and more experienced in the 
corporate world. Table 1 also reports the centrality of directors, as measured by their 
degree or number of other directors to which they are directly connected (Freeman 
1979; Bonacich 1987). Directors with multiple affiliations are, as one would expect, 
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more central in the network: they have more than twice the number of connections 
than directors with a unique affiliation because they sit in more than one board. The 
gender distribution indicates that a higher network centrality does not result in higher 
compensations: female directors are better connected than male directors, but they 
also receive half their compensation. Taken altogether, however, only about 6% of 
directors are female. Unsurprisingly, executive directors receive significantly larger 
compensations (nine times larger than non-executive directors) even though the 
difference in degree centrality is small. 
 Of particular interest for our analysis is that just 2% (152) of directors have a 
background as top civil servants or politicians. This is an important finding: of the 
approximately one thousand senior parliamentarians, government ministers and civil 
servants identified through our initial search, around 15% appear to have later become 
members of the corporate elite. This is not an inconsequential number. These 
directors include 53 former or current Members of Parliament (inclusive of the 48 
government Ministers). The remaining 81 directors are former civil servants or public 
servants of some sort (including a number of senior commanders from the armed 
forces). Unsurprisingly, most of the former politicians and civil servants hold non-
executive positions (141 of 152).
2
 We include a small number of former senior 
parliamentarians in our analyses (21 in total) who did not serve in government, but 
whose knowledge of the executive and legislative process is considered a potential 
resource for firms (notably these include three former party leaders, three shadow 
ministers and a former Vice-President of the European Commission). 
If such a small fraction of potentially employable individuals obtain post-
career rewards in the City, are there certain attributes that characterise those that are 
                                                 
2
 The total number of former politicians and civil servants discussed in the text and reported in Table 1 
do not match because some are counted more than once in Table 1 if they held two or more different 
positions whereas this discussion relates to unique individuals. 
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successful? Most (145 or 95%) are embedded in the largest component identified in 
Figure 2. Compared to all other directors, they are older and sit on the boards for 
longer. This is as might be expected from post-career earnings: most would not leave 
public office until late in their professional life. According to the average degree 
centrality shown in the last column of Table 1, former politicians and civil servants 
seem to be better placed in the overall structure than the average director, consistent 
with H2. The degree coefficient indicates that directors with a background in politics 
or government are on average connected to 8 more directors than other directors, and 
this difference is statistically significant.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
A notable finding (even when taking the small numbers into account) is that, 
in spite of their higher network centrality, former parliamentarians, ministers and civil 
servants receive significantly lower compensations overall, in line with H3. One 
potential explanation is that they tend to sit on the boards of the larger and prestigious 
corporations. This would increase their degree centrality because larger corporations 
tend to have larger boards with directors who are specialist interlocks, but would not 
increase their compensation if their corporate affiliation was limited to that single 
company. The results reported in Table 1 show that financial remuneration is twice as 
high amongst directors with multiple directorships than amongst those with a single 
affiliation.  
This difference in compensation could also result from differences in the 
appointment of former politicians and civil servants to certain board positions, namely 
non-executive directorships (NEDs). Table 2 presents further statistics that help assess 
each of these explanations. This table, and the remainder of the paper, focuses upon 
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the subset of directors that held non-executive positions (NEDs and Chairs) during 
this period. This eliminates a small number of outliers identified by Table 1 within the 
sample who held executive positions, which on average receive greater remuneration 
levels, but are individuals who entered politics or government with a pre-existing 
background in the private sector and whose re-joining the corporate network does not 
represent a post-career return to office.  
As Table 2 shows, about 30% (42 of 141) of directors with a background in 
politics or government act as interlocks (that is, they sit on more than one board), 
about 5% more than other non-executive directors; this suggests that the lower 
compensations received former politicians or civil servants cannot be due to a higher 
proportion possessing a single board affiliation only. The difference in remuneration 
between those with single and multiple directorships this group is not statistically 
significant however. There are three possible explanations for this. A first possible 
explanation suggests that rewards for service in politics and government are subject to 
downward pressure in democratic systems (H3). Indeed, recent reforms of corporate 
governance – such as Sarbanes-Oxley in the US and the Higgs Report in Britain – 
have increased oversight of corporate reward systems. In light of public hostility to 
high career and post-career rewards, former civil servants and politicians both are 
under pressure to embrace some form of material self-discipline and this could be 
reflected in the observed lower compensation levels.  
A second alternative explanation suggests that the mechanisms underlying the 
nomination of directors who previously were politicians or civil servants are more 
likely to be related to social connections instead of business expertise (Mace 1971). If 
the specialised knowledge or reputation acquired through successful corporate 
management provides directors with a competitive advantage, then this advantage 
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should be reflected in higher compensation. Last, a third alternative explanation might 
be that that the former politicians and civil servants accept directorships as symbolic 
roles or because of the prestige associated to the position. In return, these directors are 
expected to broadly support the decisions of those that enabled their appointment to 
the board. In other words, non-executive directorships for such individuals represent 
an interpersonal exchange of favours (Mace 1971).   
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 Does the structure of corporate rewards reflect differences in background, 
status and expertise within politics and government? Overall, 51 of the 141 of non-
executive directors are former Conservative politicians, 13 are former Labour 
politicians and 4 are former Liberals (although one Liberal peer started political life as 
a Conservative). While Conservatives are better represented in the sample of former 
politicians, political affiliation does not have a significant statistical effect either on 
compensation or connectedness (average degree). This lack of significance is in all 
likelihood due to the small numbers involved, which means that it is difficult to 
distinguish differences from sampling error. Nevertheless we provide substantive 
description of the numbers involved. 
 The findings on higher educational backgrounds again are consistent with the 
traditional stereotype of the British elite, with 36 having graduated from Cambridge 
and 34 from Oxford – 51% of total known cases (with the university unknown or no 
university education for 23 individuals in the dataset). Further to this, 95 of the 141 
have received a public honour (e.g. CBE), and 81 are Knights of some order (e.g. 
KCB, KCMG), confirming that former politicians and civil servants are a high status 
social group considered according to a number of different measures. While 
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individuals whom have received a knighthood receive more on average (£596,000) 
than those without any honour (£437,000) this is not statistically significant and there 
is little difference in their connectedness (average degree) .  
The results presented in Table 2 show that most non-executive directors with a 
background in British government spent part of their career at H.M. Treasury, the 
Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Trade and Industry 
(now the Department for Business and Innovation).3 Of the 48 government ministers 
and 76 civil servants, 28 served in the Treasury at some point, 30 in the Foreign 
Office, and 34 in the Ministry of Defence. Note that just three served in both the 
Treasury and Foreign Office, and just seven in both the Ministry of Defence and the 
Treasury or the Foreign Office (59 of the 141 served in none of these departments). 
There is little career overlap (12%) between these three prestigious departments of 
state. The final department of individuals before retirement or leaving government 
reflects a similar dominance of elite departments, with 12 from the Treasury, 25 from 
the Foreign Office, and 22 from the Ministry of Defence. So 42% of the political-
bureaucratic elite (59 of 141) retired from the top ranks of these elite departments. 
Departmental affiliations are therefore associated with subsequent appointment to 
corporate directorships (H4). This might be attributed to business connections 
established while in government, the technical expertise of some officials, or the 
prestige status of certain departments.  
                                                 
3 Because of perpetual reform, through mergers and break ups, of the machinery of British government, 
departments are aggregated according to function for the period between 1970 and 2008. HM Treasury 
(HMT) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) refer to single departments for the period between 1970 
and 2008. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also includes the Ministry of Overseas Development 
(1970; 1974-1979) and Department for International Development 1997-2008. The Department for 
Trade and Industry refers to a number of different government departments with responsibilities for 
business: Department of Trade and Industry 1970-1974; 1983-2005; Department of Trade 1974-1983; 
Department of Industry 1974-1983; Department of Energy 1974-1992; Department of Prices and 
Consumer Protection 1974-1979; Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2007-
2008. 
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In terms of financial remuneration, having worked in Treasury at some point is 
associated with almost £150,000 higher remuneration on average for individuals when 
compared with those who have not. Their connectedness also tends to be significantly 
higher (average degree = 40) than individuals from other departments (average degree 
= 36), with their greater earning-power and network connections suggesting that there 
are differences in associations between departmental affiliations and post-career 
rewards (H4). In contrast, having served in the Foreign Office is associated with far 
less compensation on average (£252,000) when compared with individuals who 
served in other departments (£496,000).4 Despite the relatively small number of 
people involved, these findings are consistent with H4, but also suggest the reward 
structure for an elite department such as the Foreign Office is not necessarily financial 
in nature. The connectedness of individuals with a background in the Foreign Office 
(average degree = 32) is on a par with individuals from other departments, but the 
financial compensation is not. 
The findings suggest that seniority in politics or inside government matters, 
consistent with H4. While there are no Prime Ministers amongst 58 former Ministers 
and MPs, the corporate directors include two former Chancellors of the Exchequer, 
one former leader of the Labour Party, one former leader of the Liberal Party and one 
former leader of the Liberal Democrats, 13 former Secretaries of State and two 
Chancellors of the Duchy of Lancaster. The 76 civil servants include three former 
Cabinet Secretaries (the most senior position in the British civil service), 19 former 
                                                 
4
 The results suggest that politicians and bureaucrats with some kind of background in business (or 
whose career in public office ended at a relatively early stage in their professional career) earn 
considerably more on average (£877,000 over the period between 1999 and 2008). Several former 
officials from the DTI moved from public service into the business world at a relatively early stage in 
their professional career. Although these individuals are not civil service retirees, they are classified as 
former public officials since their public service was an important stage of their career development. 
This classification is partly responsible for the high financial compensation reported for this 
department in Table 4. 
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Permanent Secretaries (the second most senior rank in the civil service), and 13 
former Ambassadors (plus two High Commissioners), one former head of defence 
sales and one former head of defence procurement, and eight former senior 
commanders of the Armed Forces. It is therefore relatively safe to suggest that only 
the very top among former politicians and civil servants end up securing rewards in 
corporate world. This evidence is further supported by the level of seniority/status 
represented in terms of the honours rank for former civil servants, with the majority 
holding knighthoods (see Appendix Table A2). 
 
 Differences between Former Politicians and Bureaucrats 
 To explore whether it is appropriate to talk about a collective population of 
former politicians and civil servants rather than distinct post-career corporate rewards 
for each group (H1), in Figure 3 (and additional analyses reported in the Appendix in 
Tables A1 and A2) we disaggregate non-executive directors into two groups: former 
ministers and MPs on the one hand and former civil servants on the other. Here the 
sample sizes become rather small, meaning that very few of the differences between 
groups are significant. However, they allow for some descriptive insights into the 
characteristics of these groups. Overall, some departments do appear to be better than 
others as springboards for subsequent transition into the corporate world – again 
consistent with H4 – with strong representation on corporate boards from former 
politicians and civil servants with a background at the Treasury (24% of the former 
politicians holding directorships, 19% of civil servants), Foreign Office (7%, 36%), 
Ministry of Defence (24%, 28%) and Department of Trade and Industry (31%, 7%). 
The percentage of civil servants who served at the Foreign Office and later became 
corporate directors is, however, far more than the percentage of politicians who 
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served as ministers. This perhaps reflects the assumed expertise and connections that 
retired ambassadors and diplomats bring to business overseas in comparison to their 
political counterparts. The reverse is true for the Department of Trade and Industry, 
suggesting that time in ministerial office in this domain is more likely to result in 
corporate appointments.  
 
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
The general structure of corporate rewards is quite similar, however, for both 
elected politicians and unelected bureaucrats, which makes it meaningful to speak of a 
relatively homogeneous population of former politicians and civil servants. There are 
certain factors associated with successful post-career rewards in the City that cannot 
be reduced to individual characteristics. The reason, in light of earlier discussion, is 
attributable to the general elite status of these institutions and to domain-specific ties 
between each of the government departments and business. The prestigious status of 
these institutions tends to attract talent as well as offering opportunities to build a 
particular type of social capital and connections, much in the same way as elite 
schools, universities or clubs contribute to the ties between directors (Whitley 1973; 
Fidler 1981; Scott and Griff 1984; Scott 1991; Kono et al. 1998; Bond 2007). These 
departments are widely regarded as premier career locations so the value of being 
member of these departments rather than others is reflected in post-career positions 
and earnings. At the same time, specific external ties of these departments provide a 
resource for future corporate rewards. The Ministry of Defence has strong links with 
the arms industry through both procurement and sales and the Treasury with high 
finance in economic policy-making, while former Foreign Office officials tend to 
have connections with foreign government and business. Such connections are 
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combined with domain-specific expertise developed within government, providing an 
attractive resource to companies when leaving public office.  
Figure 4 presents the distribution of directors in different industry sectors and 
the average compensations received in each of these sectors. The upper graph shows 
that former politicians and civil servants are disproportionately represented in 
Aerospace-Defence and Investment companies, providing evidence consistent with 
H4. The prominence of defence is both remarkable and unsurprising, given the high 
level of procurement and export activity in this domain. The lower graph confirms 
that across all sectors directors that previously served in politics or government 
receive lower compensations (H3). The following analyses aim to determine whether 
these differences are still significant once other factors (such as industry sector, 
company size or multiple directorships) are taken into account. 
 
[insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
4. Network Analysis: homogeneity of former politicians and civil servants 
within the corporate elite? 
While career bureaucrats and politicians follow quite different career paths 
during their time in public service, this analysis has highlighted the distinctive pattern 
of post-career rewards for former politicians, government ministers and civil servants. 
Classic studies of the British corporate elite (e.g. Scott and Griff 1984; Scott 1991) 
emphasize the shared social characteristics of board members. The remainder of this 
analysis considers how the attributes of this group compare to the rest of the business 
world.  
Focusing on non-executive directors and chairs, this section goes one step 
further and aims to determine whether the differences identified so far remain even 
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when controlling for all the confounding effects that also affect network position and 
compensation. Ultimately, the analysis seeks to establish whether it is possible to 
speak of a distinct group of former politicians and civil servants within the corporate 
elite or whether these individuals have similar characteristics to other non-executive 
directors and that their social and political capital is used in obtaining opportunities to 
access the corporate network – external to the network – rather than within the 
corporate world itself.  
 First, a random effects model was applied with just the intercept parameter to 
determine how much of the variance in degree centrality and compensation results 
from variation between the two groups of directors (see models DM1 and CM1 in 
Table 5). This model allows the variability around the mean to be different in the two 
groups; in other words, it splits the residuals into two levels: one for individuals, 
where differences are measured between individual values and their group means; and 
one for groups, where differences are measured between the group means and the 
overall mean (Gellman and Hill 2007). According to this model about 4.87% of the 
total variance in degree centrality can be attributed to differences between the two 
classes of directors. The model estimates that former politicians and civil servants 
have on average six more connections than those who did not build their careers in 
politics or government.
5
 The variance of compensation shows the opposite trend: the 
model estimates that directors drawn from politics or government receive, on average, 
a compensation that is about £200,000 lower; according to the model, just 0.87% of 
the total variance in compensation results from the differences between the two types 
of directors. When compared to models without the random intercept (that is, models 
                                                 
5
 I.e., if the antilogs of the intercepts are calculated for all directors this is equal to 15.72 and for former 
politicians and civil servants it is equal to 21.65 -- so the difference is just less than 6 connections. 
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that do not allow the means to vary across the two groups), the -2 log likelihood 
values indicate that the difference is significant at the 1% level. 
 These models, summarised in Table 3, provide a baseline to determine how 
significant the differences between directors remain when predictors are introduced at 
the individual level. This includes demographic variables (gender, age and education) 
that are often included in studies of corporate networks (e.g. Whitley 1973; Scott and 
Griff 1984; Scott 1991; Bond 2005; 2007) as well as variables linked to the traits of 
directors (number of directorships and experience) and firms (company size and 
industry sector). These allow us to test whether the difference between former 
politicians and civil servants and other directors is due to demographic attributes, 
board experience and the type of roles they tend to be recruited to. For example, it 
follows that if former politicians and civil servants tend to have fewer directorships 
and less experience as directors than the general population (and tend to take up non-
executive roles rather than executive positions) this should on average be associated 
with lower remuneration. In the light of the findings shown in the previous section, 
there are a number of factors that are positively associated to degree centrality and 
compensation, like gender, age and education: men are more likely to get better 
compensations but women seem to be better connected; and older and highly 
educated directors seem to be associated to better positions and rewards. The models 
that follow control for these basic demographic variables. Years of experience in 
boards of directors might also contribute to improve network centrality, but they do 
not seem to be associated to higher compensations. The role that directors have in 
those boards, however, seems to be strongly associated with higher compensations, as 
is being a multiple director: interlocks are, by definition, more central in the network 
and they are also better remunerated.  
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[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Further, the size of the company determines the degree centrality of directors 
and the industry sector influences the level of compensation. Because the same 
director might be affiliated to different companies operating in different sectors, the 
size and the sector of the organisations were operationalised using the same network 
configuration: the size of companies was approximated by calculating, for every 
director, the average degree of their neighbours in the network (so that directors 
sitting in larger corporations are linked to neighbours with higher average degrees); 
and the sector was approximated by calculating the average compensation of the 
neighbours in the network (again, directors working in, for example, the banking 
sector, will tend to have neighbours with higher average compensations). Finally, 
because the same director might also have several board roles, their board position 
was approximated using their compensation, a variable that we use to predict 
centrality in the network.    
The random effects models fitted with these individual-level variables are also 
summarised in Table 3. In the case of degree centrality (model DM2) the most 
relevant predictors are, as expected, number of directorships (that is, whether the 
director is an interlock) and board role, controlling for company size and industry 
sector. Age, gender, education and experience are not significant predictors of 
centrality. The most striking finding, however, is that once all these factors are 
controlled for there are no significant differences between directors who once served 
in politics or government and the other directors. The gap identified by model DM1 
disappears and being a former politician or civil servant does not make any difference 
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in terms of network position once all the other individual-level factors are taken into 
account. The tests for compensation are no different (model CM2): controlling for 
industry sector and company size, being a multiple director and being more central in 
the network still have a positive and quite significant impact on the level of financial 
rewards; age and experience seem to have the opposite effect: the older directors are 
and the longer they stay in boards, the lower their compensations become, all else 
equal; once all these factors are held constant, being a former politician or civil 
servant does not explain any variance in compensation. Any advantages in either the 
connectedness (H2) or compensation (H3) of former politicians and civil servants are 
therefore only secured through the same mechanisms as other directors -- with the 
same characteristics -- within the corporate network. For illustration, Figure 5 
reproduces the estimation of the models with only the significant variables. It shows 
that the most important predictors of both centrality in the corporate network and 
compensation relate to the size and sector of the companies, and to whether directors 
play interlocking roles. Gender is also associated to significantly higher compensation 
levels, as is experience. However, the data does not support the claim that the former 
parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants receive more or less advantageous 
positions or remuneration than other directors with similar characteristics.  
This finding suggests either that the value of appointing a senior politician or 
civil servant as (in most instances) a non-executive director is no different than for 
other non-executives (contra to H2) -- perhaps undertaken for symbolic or specialist 
reasons -- or that Tocquevillian pressures in political systems depress the salaries of  
individuals who enter in the private sector (consistent with H3). These findings require 
further investigation either through analysis over a longer timer period than is 
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considered here or through qualitative assessment of the reasons for appointment of 
former politicians and civil servants to corporate boards. 
 
[insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The financial returns to office obtained by former parliamentarians, ministers 
and civil servants illuminate a particular aspect of the nexus between politics and 
business. The analysis presented here shows that just a small minority of former 
politicians and civil servants obtain positions and rewards in the corporate boardroom. 
These individuals tend to share departmental and/or political backgrounds and similar 
professional trajectories. Their greatest rewards are not financial, however. In fact, 
while former parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants are better connected on 
average than other directors they tend to receive lower monetary compensations. This 
is consistent with accounts of the democratic pressures that depress the level of 
financial returns to public office. However, when compared with directors of the same 
experience, board position or industry sector these differences disappear. These 
individuals do not possess better social capital, as measured by their contacts in the 
inter-firm network.  
Time spent in public office nevertheless remains a contributing factor in the 
recruitment of these former parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants to corporate 
boards. While just a very small fraction of former politicians and civil servants 
migrate to the corporate world after a career in public service, the majority built their 
careers in the same departments – an indication that such previous political and 
governmental experience and connections perform a significant role in defining their 
post-career trajectories in the corporate world. The evidence suggests that three 
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premier departments – the Treasury, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence – 
provide greatest opportunities for access to the corporate world, with former public 
officials strongly represented (in relative terms) in the defence sector. Whether such a 
pattern is due to the prestige of these departments, close ties to industry or other types 
of interdependencies requires further investigation. 
Further limitations of this study that should motivate future research include 
the limited time frame of the BoardEx database, which offers full coverage from 1999 
onwards, but not historical data on corporate boards and directors. This prohibits us 
from offering more wide-ranging analysis of lifetime career earnings (e.g. Eggers and 
Hainmueller 2009) in particular for the period from the late 1970s onwards which is 
said to have marked a shift in the club-like relationship between the institutions of 
British government and the private sector (Moran 2003). Nevertheless, this detailed 
mapping of the political and corporate network over a period of a decade offers 
insights into the financial returns to office of an elite group of politicians and civil 
servants. Further, it enables us to determine whether the pattern of recruitment of 
individuals with a background in politics or government to corporate boards is distinct 
from other directors in terms of connectedness and remuneration   
The second limitation is that this analysis focuses upon the public face of 
financial returns to office: appointments to corporate boards. Given the pressure on 
the earnings of both politicians and senior civil servants, observed across democratic 
systems, directorships of companies might have become less attractive in comparison 
to less transparent earning possibilities such as consulting roles, where the public 
disclosure of the corporate relationship is not required. The corporate governance role 
undertaken in non-executive directorships might, in fact, make such positions less 
suited to the skills and/or interests of former politicians in comparison to advisory 
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positions more oriented toward networking and advocacy (The Financial Times, 14 
September 2009, p. 7). Such a shift in patterns of migration from public life to the 
corporate world might be expected given that the internal labour market of the British 
civil service has become more porous in recent times. This is a promising area for 
future research, using longitudinal methods to investigate the recruitment of former 
politicians and civil servants to corporate boards, consultancies and advisory roles 
over time. 
Overall, this analysis has shown that there is a connection between service in 
parliament or British government and levels of connectedness and remuneration in the 
corporate world. However, these patterns are not significant when essential features of 
individual directors and the corporate network are controlled for. This contributes to 
understanding of governing and business elites and the translation of connections and 
expertise from one realm into another. The pattern of post-career earnings and 
network positions also reflects the prestigious status of a few elite departments in 
government. There is a correspondence between certain and highly select high offices 
of state and business.   
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Figure 1. One-Mode Projection of the Network of Corporate Directors 
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Figure 2. Components in the Network of Interlocking Directorates 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Characteristics of Ministers/MPs and Civil Servants with 
Non-Executive Positions (1999-2008) 
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Figure 4. Percentage of Directors in Industry Sectors (Upper Panel) and Total 
Compensation by Sector (Lower Panel) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the dashed horizontal line marks the overall average level of compensation for all directors 
across all sectors. Bars are ranked in descending order in terms of the ratio of the share of former 
parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants.
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Figure 5. Factors Explaining Degree Centrality and Compensation 
Intercept
Education
Experience
Gender (male)
Age
Size personal network
Compensation
Industry sector
Nr of directorships
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Predictors of Degree Centrality
estimated coefficients
Intercept
Education
Experience
Gender (male)
Age
Size personal network
Centrality
Industry sector
Nr of directorships
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Predictors of Compensation
estimated coefficients
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Table 1. Characteristics of Directors in the Network for the 1999-2008 Period (10 
years) 
 
 
Note: bold figures represent differences that are statistically significant at the 1% level according to 
both the Student’s t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The tests were not run for the shadowed 
rows because these statistics refer to overlapping categories (i.e. the same director might be classified 
in more than one group: while 152 directors have a background in high public office, some public 
officials are counted more than once if they held two or more different positions). 
 N 
Avg. 
Age 
Avg. 
Comp. 
(000’s) 
Avg. Yrs. 
 Experience 
Avg. 
 Degree 
Interlock      
Yes 1494 53 3106 2.15 43 
No 6442 52 1543 1.80 16 
      
Gender           
Male 7435 52 1923 1.90 21 
Female 501 48 888 1.34 24 
Education      
Degree 1501 51 1991 1.98 22 
Postgrad 4128 52 2101 1.97 23 
      
Board Role      
Executive 3744 47 3477 0.85 22 
Non-Executive 4192 56 382 2.78 21 
      
Former Politicians & Civil Servants           
 No 7784 52 1893 1.85 21 
 Yes 152 60 511 2.49 29 
       
 Politics & Government      
 Ministers 48 59 328 2.98 27 
 MPs  53 60 339 3.20 24 
 Civil Servants 81 61 575 1.66 32 
       
 Corporate Position      
 CEO 3 63 548 1.20 28 
 ED 8 55 1564 1.30 38 
 OPS 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 CHAIR 40 59 1141 3.23 38 
 NED 133 60 343 2.18 30 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Former Parliamentarians, Ministers and Civil Servants 
with Non-Executive Positions (1999-2008) 
 
 
 
Note: bold figures represent differences that are statistically significant at the 5% level (according to 
both the Student’s t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, and to  the ANOVA test for the ‘Rank’ 
grouping variable). The tests for party affiliation refer to the binary base category (i.e. affiliated to any 
of the other two parties). 
 
 N 
Avg. 
Age 
Avg. 
Comp. 
(000’s) 
Avg. Yrs.  
Experience 
Avg.  
Degree 
Interlock           
Yes 42 59 619 2.21 53 
No 99 61 373 2.75 18 
Gender      
Male 130 61 440 2.70 27 
Female 11 58 536 1.25 46 
Education      
Degree 39 62 281 1.98 30 
Postgrad 70 60 461 2.46 30 
      
      
      
Business Background      
Yes 32 60 877 2.82 32 
No 109 61 314 2.53 28 
Honours      
Knighthood 81 62 596 2.15 31 
Honour 14 62 232 3.20 23 
No Honour 46 57 437 2.89 27 
HMT      
Yes 28 60 573 2.00 40 
No 113 61 416 2.73 26 
FCO      
Yes 30 62 252 1.59 32 
No 111 60 496 2.87 28 
MoD      
Yes 34 62 347 1.71 24 
No 107 60 479 2.88 30 
DTI      
Yes 23 60 473 2.21 23 
No 118 61 442 2.67 30 
Party      
Conservative 51 59 474 3.84 25 
Liberal 4 62 100 3.98 11 
Labour 13 58 370 1.23 36 
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Table 3. Factors Explaining Degree Centrality and Compensation for Directors in 
Non-Executive Positions (NEDs and Chairs)  
 
 Degree Centrality 
(log) 
Compensation (log) 
 DM1 DM2 CM1 CM2 
     
Intercept All Other Directors 2.755 -0.617 5.053 0.653 
 
Intercept Former Politicians & Civil Servants
  
3.075 -0.617 4.798 0.653 
 
Overall Intercept 2.915 
(0.117) 
-0.617 
(0.065) 
4.926 
(0.104) 
0.653 
(0.229) 
Education  -0.003 
(0.014) 
  0.022 
(0.050) 
Age  -0.000 
(0.001) 
 0.008 
(0.003) 
Experience (log)  0.004 
(0.008) 
 0.079 
(0.027) 
Industry sector (avg. ntwk. comp., log)  0.094 
(0.008) 
 0.321 
(0.030) 
Company size (avg. ntwk. degree, log)  0.647 
(0.018) 
 -0.352 
(0.075) 
Gender (male)  -0.016 
(0.024) 
 0.341 
(0.082) 
Compensation ( log)  0.049 
(0.006) 
  
Personal Network (degree, log)    0.598 
(0.067) 
Number of directorships  0.389 
(0.007) 
 0.345 
(0.038) 
     
Variance due to Between-Group Differences 4.87% 0.00% 0.866% 0.00% 
     
 
 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Bold figures are significant effects at the 1% level. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Characteristics of Ministers/MPs with Non-Executive Positions (1999-
2008) 
 
 
 
Note: bold figures represent differences that are statistically significant at the 5% level (according to 
both the Student’s t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, and to  the ANOVA test for the ‘Honors’ and 
‘Rank’ grouping variables).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N 
Avg. 
Age 
Avg. 
Comp. 
(000’s) 
Avg. Yrs.  
Experience 
Avg.  
Degree 
Gender           
Male 53 60 294 3.57 23 
Female 5 58 218 0.43 40 
Education      
Degree 14 61 332 2.51 27 
Postgrad 31 59 292 2.75 25 
Business Background      
Yes 9 62 139 2.59 22 
No 49 59 317 3.50 25 
Honours      
Knighthood 14 61 309 3.46 27 
Honour 8 62 278 2.64 30 
No Honour 36 58 332 3.22 23 
HMT      
Yes 14 59 441 2.77 40 
No 44 60 243 3.54 20 
FCO      
Yes 4 56 237 1.25 22 
No 54 60 292 3.52 25 
MoD      
Yes 14 60 349 2.41 30 
No 44 59 269 3.66 23 
DTI      
Yes 18 61 242 2.46 22 
No 40 59 309 3.76 26 
Rank      
(Parliamentarian) 0 12 59 727 3.5 23 
(Junior Minister) 1 6 58 214 4.5 29 
(Minister) 2 18 60 383 1.8 28 
(Secretary of State) 3 22 63 409 2.5 32 
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Table A2. Characteristics of Civil Servants with Non-Executive Positions (1999-
2008) 
 
 
 
Note: bold figures represent differences that are statistically significant at the 5% level (according to 
both the Student’s t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, and to  the ANOVA test for the ‘Honors’ and 
‘Rank’ grouping variables).  
 
 N 
Avg. 
Age 
Avg. 
Comp. 
(000’s) 
Avg. Yrs.  
Experience 
Avg. Degree 
Gender           
Male 71 62 471 1.64 31 
Female 4 57 395 2.08 39 
Education      
Degree 25 62 252 1.68 31 
Postgrad 34 61 577 1.79 33 
Business Background      
Yes 17 59 1060 1.59 39 
No 58 63 279 1.69 29 
Honours      
Knighthood 64 62 577 1.7 33 
Honour 4 62 155 1.5 13 
No Honour 7 55 715 1.7 36 
HMT      
Yes 14 61 696 1.23 42 
No 61 62 409 1.77 29 
FCO      
Yes 27 62 247 1.59 33 
No 48 62 586 1.71 30 
MoD      
Yes 21 63 330 1.18 20 
No 54 61 516 1.86 36 
DTI      
Yes 5 60 1261 1.32 26 
No 70 62 406 1.69 32 
Rank      
(Other) 0 9 60 965 1.21 33 
 (Grade 2, Executive) 1 5 60 362 2.83 43 
(Director-General, Ambassador) 2 37 62 367 1.47 27 
(Permanent/Cabinet Secretary) 3 24 63 440 1.95 34 
      
